In this paper we study the semantics of the -calculus induced by Milner's encoding into the -calculus. We show that the resulting may testing preorder on -terms coincides with the inclusion of L evy-Longo trees. To establish this result, we use a re nement of the -calculus where the argument of a function may be of limited availability. In ourcalculus with multiplicities, evaluation is deterministic, but it may deadlock, due to the lack of resources. We show that this feature is enough to make the -calculus as discriminating as the -calculus.
Introduction
A few years ago, Milner, Parrow and Walker introduced a calculus of mobile processes 20], now called the -calculus, which is a name passing extension of Milner's CCS 17] . A version of this calculus was rst discovered by Engberg and Nielsen 10] , following early discussions between Nielsen and Milner (see the conclusion of 20], Part I). The paper 20] nicely demonstrated the usefulness of the name passing discipline, by a series of examples showing clearly its expressiveness. Milner quickly realized that one can encode the -calculus into the -calculus 18], a remarkable achievement, showing the universality of the -calculus in some sense. This result was further studied and extended, most notably by Sangiorgi 23] , who established that the -calculus is powerful enough to encode a very general form of agent passing. Milner actually gave two encodings in 18], one for the lazy -calculus of Abramsky and Ong 3] , and another for the weak call-by-value -calculus of Plotkin 22] . It turns out that, in both cases, the -calculus is strictly more expressive than the -calculus, in the sense that some -terms that are equated using -calculus means can be distinguished in the -calculus. Milner then raised the question: \Exactly what is the semantics induced upon -terms by encoding them into the -calculus?" In more concrete terms, one could ask: how does a functional language survive when integrated within concurrent features? For instance, which program transformations or optimization techniques remain valid? The purpose of this paper is to investigate Milner's question, for the \lazy encoding".
To introduce our contribution, let us rst formulate the question more precisely. In CCSlike calculi, there is a natural notion of immediate observability: a process P is immediately observable, in notation P#, if P exhibits, without any internal computation, a capability of communicating with its environment. That is, P is able to perform an action (input or output). Now a process P is observable, in notation P+, if it may become immediately observable, possibly after some internal computations, that is 9P 0 ; P ! P 0 & P 0 #. The = ( x xx)( x xx) is di erent from x . L evy's interpretation provides a rather intensional semantics for -terms, which may be regarded as the nest reasonable semantics one can imagine. This was established by Longo in 15] , who showed that any \reasonable" -model induces a semantics which is weaker than L evy's one. Then the -semantics on -terms is at the same time very sharp and still \reasonable".
In 25], Sangiorgi indicates that one may suspect that may testing equivalence M ' N (that is M v N and N v N) and bisimulation M N coincide { a reason should be that -terms are \deterministic processes". This is indeed a consequence of a result of this paper: we show, thus answering Milner's question, that M v N coincides with M v L N, the preorder induced by L evy's interpretation, that is the inclusion of L evy-Longo trees. Considering Sangiorgi's work, the fact that -calculus semantics of -terms is again related to L evy's semantics should not be too surprising. In particular, the fact that L evy's semantics is stronger than -may testing is a direct consequence of results of 25] . However, the proof method we use for showing M v N ) M v L N is completely di erent from that of 25] for the similar implication involving bisimulation in place of may testing. In fact, the way we prove it is the main contribution of this paper.
To prove this implication, we use a re nement of the -calculus introduced in 6], namely the -calculus with multiplicities. To motivate this re nement, let us point out one typical reason why the -calculus is more discriminating than the -calculus. Milner's encoding translates -reduction as follows:
E ( xM)N] ]u ! ( x)( E M] ]u j !x(w)E N] ]w) E N= x ]M]
]u where !P represents an in nite parallel composition (P j j P ), see 19] for instance (the version of the -calculus we use is presented in Section 2 below). This is needed to adequately model the fact that, in an application RN, the argument N is in nitely available for the function R. Indeed, if R = xM, this term reduces to N= x ]M where the argument is copied within M as many times as there are free occurrences of x. One cannot predict the \multiplicity" of x in M, because M could be reduced to another term where this variable is duplicated. This is the case for instance if M = (2x) where 2 = fy:f(fy). Now, in the -calculus, one is not compelled to use in nitely available resources. For instance, one could write something like a -term where the argument is available at most m times, namely:
Our purpose is to show that the limited availability of a resource is precisely the reason why the -calculus is more discriminating than the -calculus. Firstly, we note that this provides us with extra discriminating power. For instance, the two terms xx and x( y:xy) are equated in the canonical denotational semantics of the lazy -calculus (see 3]), while, in the -calculus, one may distinguish them by providing just one sample of the identity I = zz for x. More precisely, the term
is not observable { it reduces to a deadlock {, whereas
converges. This led us to introduce a -calculus with explicit ( nite or in nite) multiplicities, writing MN m where m 2 N f1g to mean that N is available at most m times for M. As a particular case, we get the usual -terms, where all the multiplicities are in nite { in which case we may omit them, to keep the standard notation. We call this new calculus the m -calculus. Obviously, as in the -calculus, evaluating a m -term may end up with a deadlock. This is the case of ( x:xx)I 1 , for instance, where one needs two values for x but has just one. Actually, the -calculus suggests an even more liberal extension of the -calculus. After all, one is not compelled to use copies of the same argument as resources. One could write in the -calculus:
For example, it is possible to encode in this way a non-deterministic internal choice:
The further extension of the -calculus where the arguments, that is P in MP are bags of terms was introduced in 6]. The syntax for bags follows that of the -calculus: O is the empty bag and (P j Q) is the (multiset) union of P and Q. However, we write M 1 for a bag consisting of M with an in nite multiplicity, rather than !M. We call this the -calculus with resources, or r -calculus. Obviously, it contains the -calculus with multiplicities, since one may let N m = (N j j N), m times. The m and r -calculi are similar in spirit to the -calculus. They are all based on the idea of a function applied to arguments, or more generally to bags of arguments. They could be \implemented" by variants of the same abstract machine where the value of a variable in the environment may be something more complex than M 1 . However, the evaluation mechanisms exhibit di erent features. In the lazy -calculus, the evaluation is deterministic, that is, at most one reduction is possible at each step, and may either diverge or terminate on a value, i.e. an abstraction. In the m -calculus, evaluation is still deterministic, but in addition it may deadlock. The r -calculus further adds possible non determinism in the evaluation, because one may choose any of the resources that a bag contains to instantiate a variable. Therefore, it is natural to re ne not only the syntax and evaluation, but also the semantics.
In this paper we take the view that divergence, deadlock and convergence are distinguished by the observer. More precisely, divergence is not observed, while deadlock and convergence are observed di erently. Then the may testing semantics for m and r is de ned as follows:
M The paper is organized as follows: the rst two sections give a brief account of the -calculus and the weak -calculus. Then we introduce the -calculus with resources and the -calculus with multiplicities, their syntax and evaluation mechanism. Next we de ne the observational semantics and show the context lemma. The last two sections are devoted to the proof of our main result: we rst show, establishing the approximation lemma and the separation lemma, that L evy's semantics coincides with that induced by the r and m -calculi. Then we show that these are weaker than the -calculus semantics. The converse is proved using Sangiorgi's results in 25]. Finally we conclude by comparing our results with related work.
The -calculus
In this paper we adopt the same asynchronous \mini" -calculus as in 25], built upon a given denumerable set N of names, ranged over by u; v; w : : : The di erences with other versions, e.g. in 20, 18, 19] , are the following: rstly, we do not use the sum and matching constructs P + Q and u = v]P. The input construct u(v 1 ; : : :; v k )P allows P to receive on the channel u several names simultaneously, as in the polyadic -calculus of 19]. Correspondingly, an output sends several names simultaneously. However, it is not a guard. That is, it takes the form of an asynchronous message uv 1 v k . Besides the \empty" process O, the remaining constructs are parallel composition (P j Q), replication !P and restriction, or scoping ( u)P. The syntax of this (mini) -calculus is thus: P ::= O j uv 1 v k j u(v 1 ; : : :; v k )P j (P j P) j !P j ( u)P where k 0 and u; v 1 ; : : :; v k are names. We let denote the set of -terms, ranged over by P; Q; : : : The names v 1 ; : : :; v k in an input pre x u(v 1 ; : : :; v k ) are assumed to be pairwise distinct. They are bound by this construct, and similarly u is bound by a restriction ( u). We denote by fn(P ) and bn(P ) the set of names occurring respectively free and bound in P, and nm(P ) denotes the union of these two sets. We denote by u= v ]P the operation of substituting the name u for v in P. This may require some renaming, to avoid binding u, as in thecalculus. More generally, we denote by u 1 ; : : :; u n=v 1 ; : : :; v n ]P the simultaneous substitution of u 1 ; : : :; u n for v 1 ; : : :; v n respectively in P. We denote by P = Q the -conversion, that is the least congruence satisfying u(v 1 ; : : :; v k )P = u(w 1 ; : : :; w k ) w 1=v 1 ] w k=v k ]P where w 1 ; : : :; w k are distinct names not in nm(P ), and ( u)P = ( v) v= u ]P where v 6 2 nm(P ). We shall sometimes write ue v for uv 1 v k , and similarly for the input pre x u(e v)P, for the substitution e w= e v ]P, and for a sequence of restrictions ( e u)P. The structural equivalence P Q over -terms is the least congruence containing = , and satisfying the following equations:
The reduction relation P ! P 0 is given by the following rules:
( uw 1 w k j u(v 1 ; : : :; v k )P ) ! w 1 ; : : :; w k=v 1 ; : : :; v k ]P Q P ; P ! P 0 Q ! P 0 P ! P 0 (P j Q) ! (P 0 j Q)
We may simply write the basic reduction step as ( u e w j u(e v)P) ! e w= e v ]P provided that the sequences of names e w and e v have the same length. To distinguish -reduction from other notions of reduction we shall consider, we sometimes use the notation P ! P 0 . The re exive and transitive closure of this relation is denoted !, as usual. The predicate P# of immediate observability is de ned by P# , 9u: P # u where P # u is the least relation satisfying
The following is easy to check: In the following we shall use a result which is proved by Sangiorgi in 25]. He de nes an equivalence on the -calculus based on labelled transitions between -terms. These transitions may be de ned as follows: the labels are either input actions, that is a = u(v 1 ; : : :; v k ), or output actions a = ( w 1 ) ( w n ) uv 1 v k , and:
(i) P a ! P 0 where a = u(v 1 ; : : :; v k ) if and only if P ( u 1 ) ( u n )(u(v 1 ; : : :; v k )R j Q) with u 6 2 fu 1 ; : : :; u n g and v i 6 2 fn(Q), and P 0 = ( u 1 ) ( u n )(R j Q)
(ii) P a ! P 0 where a = ( w 1 ) ( w m ) uv 1 v k if and only if P ( u 1 ) ( u n )( uv 1 v k j Q) with u 6 2 fu 1 ; : : :; u n g, fw 1 ; : : :; w m g = fu 1 ; : : :; u n g \ fv 1 ; : : :; v k g and P 0 = ( s 1 ) ( s h )Q where fs 1 ; : : :; s h g = fu 1 ; : : :; u n g ? fw 1 ; : : :; w m g.
Clearly P# if and only if P a ! P 0 for some a and P 0 . Now by just removing the symmetry requirement from Sangiorgi's De nition 2.2 of \weak ground bisimilarity", one may de ne:
De nition 2.3 (Simulation) A relation S on -terms is a simulation if it satis es: (i) if P S Q and P ! P 0 then there exists Q 0 such that Q ! Q 0 and P 0 S Q 0 , (ii) if P S Q and P a ! P 0 then there exists Q 0 such that Q ! a ! ! Q 0 and P 0 S Q 0 . P simulates Q, written P Q, if P S Q for some simulation S. This is essentially Sangiorgi's Corollary 3.6 25], once one remarks that symmetry does not play any rôle in the proof.
Corollary 2.5 P Q ) P v Q This is obvious since
The weak -calculus
The denumerable set X of variables used to build -terms is assumed to be a subset of N, such that N ?X is in nite. When we write u; v; w : : : we usually mean names that are not variables, and we use x; y; z : : : to range over X. We recall that -terms are given by the following grammar:
We assume the reader is familiar with the notions of free and bound variables, -conversion M = N, substitution N= x ]M, and -conversion M = N, that is the congruence generated by ( xM)N = N= x ]M, see 4]. We use the standard notations: is the set of -terms, is the subset of closed terms, x 1 : : :x n :M stands for x 1 : : : x n M, and MN 1 N n abbreviates ( (MN 1 ) N n ).
In the -calculus literature, the word weak refers to the failure or disregarding of the -rule To recover L evy's ordering M v L N on the tree representation, one de nes an operation xT on trees, consisting in pre xing the label of the root of T by x, with the rule that x = . Then a tree T is less than T 0 whenever T 0 is obtained from T by replacing some leaves labelled x 1 : : :x n :? in T by trees x 1 : : :x n :T 00 . An example of an in nite L evy-Longo tree is provided by Wadsworth's combinator J, satisfying J = xy: x(Jy), which may be de ned by J = ( f xy: x(ffy))( f xy: x(ffy)). The tree for this term is:
LT(J) = xy 0 :x j y 1 :y 0 j y 2 :y 1 . . .
In the rest of this section we start relating the -calculus with the -calculus. The main result here, which we prove using Sangiorgi's results in 25], is that L evy's interpretation is adequate with respect to the \ -semantics". Let us rst recall the encoding of the -calculus into the -calculus given by Milner 18] , written in the \asynchronous" and polyadic style. It is the mapping E ] ]: (N ? X) ! de ned as follows:
) where x 6 2 fv(N) and
In this encoding, the name u represents a \continuation", standing for the evaluation context of the -term, that is pointing to the argument sequence for that term. In the case where the term is an application, the rst argument is pushed on the top of this sequence (the resulting evaluation context is now v). More precisely, a pointer x to the rst argument is stacked, since the encoding models an environment machine for the lazy -calculus, where the operation of substitution is replaced by access to environment entries x := N] ] binding names to terms. In the case of an abstraction xM, the rst item x of the argument sequence is popped from the current continuation u, and the rest v is passed to the body M. In the case of a variable x, the encoding represents the application of this name to the current argument sequence. The encoding establishes a close correspondence between the reduction relations of the two calculi, see 18, 25] . For instance we have: Then the syntax of our -calculus with resources, or r -calculus, is as follows:
To avoid any confusion with usual -terms, denoted M; N; : : : we use E; F; : : : to range over terms of our calculus. The set of terms is r . The bags of terms will be denoted P; Q; : : : when no confusion with -terms may arise.
We denote by fv(E) and bv(E) the sets of free and bound variables of E. This is de ned as usual, except that x is bound in E by the construct hR= x i, that is fv(EhR= x i) = (fv(E) ? fxg) fv(R) where fv(R) is de ned in the obvious way: fv(P j Q) = fv(P ) fv(Q), and so on. The set of closed terms is denoted r . We shall consider r -terms up to -conversion. This is de ned as usual, with the additional clause that ( z= x ]E)hR= z i = EhR= x i, where z is neither free nor bound in E. The structural equivalence over r is the least congruence containing -conversion and satisfying:
(P j (Q j R)) ((P j Q) j R) EPhQ= x i EhQ= x iP ( ) (P j Q) (Q j P) EhP= x ihQ= z i EhQ= z ihP= x i ( ) (P j O) P E 1 (E j E 1 ) ( ) where x 6 2 fv(P ) ( ) where x 6 = z, x 6 2 fv(Q) and z 6 2 fv(P ).
Note that the substitution items may always be pushed on the right of a term. That is, EhQ= x iP may always be regarded, by possibly renaming x, as EPhQ= x i. Therefore, any term E is, up to structural equivalence, of the form HP 1 P n hQ1= x 1 i hQk= x k i where H is either a variable or an abstraction.
The reduction relation on r is split into two parts: one is the usual (weak) -reduction, written with explicit substitutions. The second part deals with the management of substitution. Since in our calculus, the resources may be of limited availability, we will not \perform" the substitutions hP= x i by distributing them over the subterms. We will rather use them in a delayed manner, waiting for a resource to be actually needed for x. Assuming that any term E has the shape HP 1 P n hQ1= x 1 i hQk= x k i where H = xF or H = x, we may describe intuitively the reduction relation as follows:
(1) if H is an abstraction xF, there are two cases: either n = 0, in which case E is a normal form (a closure, that is an abstraction within the environment hQ1= x 1 i hQk= x k i), or there is an argument, i.e. n 6 = 0, in which case the following reduction takes place: E ! FhP1= x iP 2 P n hQ1= x 1 i hQk= x k i This is formalized by saying that the reduction rules include the -rule, written with explicit substitutions, and allow to perform computations in the left subterm of ER and EhR= x i. Moreover, one should be able to rst transform E into a term having the appropriate shape. Then our rst rules for reduction are:
if H is a variable x (the head variable), one looks for the rst substitution for it, if any, in the environment hQ1= x 1 i hQk= x k i. Assume that i is the rst index such that x i = x. Then one fetches for x a resource out of Q i , that is a term F 2 r such that Q i (F j R), if any.
The rest R is left for future use. Roughly, the following reduction takes place in this case: E ! FP 1 P n hQ1= x 1 i hR= x i i hQk= x k i
Notice that F is a term, not a bag, and therefore such a reduction cannot be performed if the bag Q i is empty, that is Q i O. One should be careful not to bind any free variable of F. That is, one should rst rename the variables x 1 ; : : :; x i , so that they do not occur in F. To state the \fetch" rule, which is the last rule for reduction, it is convenient to introduce an auxiliary relation EhF= x i ; E 0 , meaning that x is the head variable of E, and that E 0 is obtained by To distinguish the r -reduction from the one of the and -calculi, we shall use the notation E ! r F. It is not di cult to check that the rules for reduction appropriately formalize the computation steps we intuitively described above, that is: Lemma 4.1 E ! r E 0 if and only if (i) either E ( xF)P 1 P n hQ1= x 1 i hQk= x k i with n > 0, and E 0 = FhP1= x iP 2 P n hQ1= x 1 i hQk= x k i, (ii) or E x i P 1 P n hQ1= x 1 i hF j R= x i i hQk= x k i where j i ) x j 6 2 fv(F ) and j < i ) x j 6 = x i , and E 0 = FP 1 P n hQ1= x 1 i hR= x i i hQk= x k i.
This reduction process is more like evaluation in an abstract machine setting, where the states have the form (E; P 1 P n ; hQ1= x 1 i hQk= x k i), than a preorder associated with an equational theory, as -reduction, possibly with explicit substitutions, is usually presented (see 1, 4] for instance). It is possible to de ne a notion of reduction in this broader sense for the r -calculus, but this is not relevant for the purpose of this paper. One may immediately observe that rreduction exhibits some features that make it very di erent from -reduction, namely:
(1) non-determinism. Since the composition (P j Q) of bags of resources is commutative, the fetch rule is non deterministic: one may fetch any of the resources that a bag contains. This is best exempli ed by de ning a non deterministic internal choice:
(E F) = def xhE j F = x i x 6 2 fv(E) fv(F )
Clearly (E F) ! r EhF= x i and (E F) ! r FhE= x i Now any reasonable semantics should equate EhP= x i and E whenever x 6 2 fv(E), therefore (E F) adequately represents the choice between E and F.
(2) deadlocks. A deadlock arises whenever a resource is both needed and absent. Typically, a term like x P 1 P n hO= x i cannot perform any reduction. Therefore, besides the usual normal forms { abstractions calling for an argument {, there is a new kind of irreducible term: variables waiting in vain for a resource.
One may identify which construct of r is responsible for a particular feature of the evaluation process. In other words, one may de ne various sub-calculi of r where evaluation is constrained in some way. Clearly, non-determinism comes from the fact that a bag may contain two di erent terms { and from the commutativity of the bag union operation. Then a natural restriction to consider is to deal with bags made of copies of the same term. Such a bag is just a term with an explicit nite or in nite multiplicity, de ned as follows:
The -calculus with multiplicities is the sub-calculus m of r given by the grammar:
E ::= x j xE j (EE m ) j EhE m = x i where m 2 N f1g. This is the calculus we considered in 9, 8] . In particular, we showed in 9] that this sub-calculus is deterministic in the sense that, up to structural equivalence, a m -term may perform at most one reduction in one step: Lemma As a matter of fact, the reduction relation in m may be described in a slightly more precise way than as the restriction of the r -reduction to m -terms. Indeed, one can see that the laws for structural equivalence regarding the bags are useless when considering m -terms. Namely, the structural equivalence m on m is the least congruence containing -conversion and satisfying Obviously, deadlocks are still possible when evaluating m -terms. On the other hand, this would be avoided if any resource from a bag were available at will. Then another sub-calculus of r that naturally arises is the -calculus with \in nite resources" 1r , given by the grammar:
E ::= x j xE j (ER) j EhR= x i R ::= E 1 j (R j R)
Internal choice is obviously de nable in this calculus:
(E F) = xhE 1 j F 1 = x i x 6 2 fv(E) fv(F ) Indeed, 1r is essentially the same as , the usual -calculus enriched with internal choice (see 5]). Therefore, while evaluation in m is deterministic with potential deadlocks, in 1r it is non deterministic, without deadlocks. The intersection of the two sub-calculi, denoted 1 , is given by the grammar E ::= x j xE j (EE 1 ) j EhE 1 = x i
This last sub-calculus may be regarded as \the -calculus", with explicit resources. Indeed, there is an obvious translation from to 1 , namely:
In 6] we showed that this translation is fully abstract. To see what this means, we rst have to de ne the observational semantics.
The observational semantics
We have seen that the evaluation of a given r -term may diverge, deadlock or terminate properly, and that these possibilities are not mutually exclusive. Then the notion of observability may be richer than in the -calculus, and this gives us some freedom in de ning the observational semantics of our calculus.
Since we are dealing with \may testing" for the -calculus, we shall keep this kind of semantics for our -calculus with resources. This is much weaker than the bisimulation semantics usually adopted when dealing with a non deterministic calculus (see 24] , for instance), though we shall see that, as far as the -calculus is concerned, may testing is as ne as bisimulation. As we suggested, computations in r may be observed in several ways. To formalize this point, let us introduce a domain of observations D = f?; ; g, the elements of which respectively represent divergence, deadlock and proper termination, that is convergence to a value. In our calculus, a value is a closure, that is a term given by the grammar: V ::= xE j V hP= x i Let V denote the set of values. A deadlock is a closed term F which is a normal form, but not a value, that is fF 0 j F ! F 0 g = ; and F 6 2 V. We denote by W the set of deadlocks. Then we de ne the observation function obs(E), associating a set of observations with any closed term E, as follows:
1. ? 2 obs(E) if and only if E may diverge, that is there exists an in nite sequence (E n ) n2N of terms such that E 0 = E and E n ! r E n+1 for any n 2 Given a preorder on D, we say that E is observationally better than F if, for any r -context C closing both E and F, and for any observation o 2 obs(C F]), there exists an observation o 0 2 obs(C E]) which is better than o.
Several observation scenarios, that is preorders on D, are possible { taking Scott's view that divergence provides no information, that is any observation is better than ?. In the \standard" scenario, deadlock is not distinguished from divergence. The corresponding observational semantics has the usual de nition in this case, based on the observability predicate E+ meaning that E may have a value. This is the semantics we adopted in 6, 9] for the -calculus with multiplicities m . We showed that, for this calculus, this semantics is the same as the one we would get by adopting a di erent scenario, where is strictly in between ? and , see 8].
In 9] we characterized the standard semantics induced by m -contexts over -terms, showing that it is strictly weaker than L evy's semantics. Since here we are dealing with the relationships between the and calculi, it is appropriate to consider another observation scenario, It is implicitly assumed in this de nition that C E] and C F] are both closed, since obs is only de ned on closed terms. By restricting the contexts to be m , or 1r , or 1 -contexts in the de nition, we get corresponding preorders v m , v 1r and v 1 respectively. Note that in the two latter cases, the observational semantics has the standard de nition: E is less than F if, for all contexts C, if C E] may converge then C F] may converge. We denote by ' r , ' m , ' 1r and ' 1 the respective associated equivalences. There is an obvious ordering relation between these semantics: a broader class of contexts determines a stronger semantics. Due to the universal quanti cation over contexts, the de nition of the observational semantics is not very manageable: it is usually quite di cult to prove an inequation E v r F. the lexicographic ordering, where h is the number of occurrences of holes in C. We may write C = C 0 C 1 C m where C 0 is either a hole ] i , or a variable x, or an abstraction context x B, and the C j 's, for j > 0, are bags or substitution contexts. We examine the possible cases (this proof technique is directly adapted from L evy's one 14], with the notable di erence that we are dealing with open terms).
(1) if C 0 = xB, we have, by pushing the susbtitutions on the right while possibly renaming the variables that are bound by these substitutions: in a similar way, that is, using the fact that m -reduction is deterministic.
Note that the rst implication cannot be reversed in general, because r -reduction is non deterministic. It is an easy exercise to show, using the Context Lemma, that internal choice is a As a rst step towards these results, we establish a property that we call the approximation lemma (cf. 14]). It states that, to observe C M] in some way (where M is a -term and C a r -context), only a nite amount of information about M needs to be known. Intuitively, this should be clear, because M can only participate by a nite number of reduction steps in a computation of C M]. Moreover, it is only when M shows up in the head position, as a function applied to a series of arguments, that it has to exhibit some speci c nite intensional content, like beginning with a series of abstractions. Then any term having at least the same intensional content is as good as M, as far as the observability within the context C is concerned. The appropriate formalization of \ nite intensional content" is given by approximants. Lemma For lack of space, we omit the proof, and just give a sketch (again, a proof of a similar result for the standard observation scenario is given in full details in 9]. The situation here is simpler, because the semantics v r is much more discriminatingthan the standard one, therefore it is easier to separate terms by distinguishing deadlock from divergence). To apply B ohm's technique, it is convenient to use an alternative characterization of L evy's preorder, as the \limit"of a decreasing sequence of preorders: Then the separation lemma is established by induction on the least integer k such that M 6 k N, and by a systematic inspection of the possible cases. It must be noted that the easiest proof of such a separation lemma would be obtained using a version of the r -calculus where the commutativity law (P j Q) (Q j P) is disallowed (except for Q = O). In this case, for any resource term we have either R O, or R (E j P) for a unique E. Such a calculus, where the resources are arranged not as bags, but in a stack-like manner, is deterministic (in the sense of the Lemma 4.2), but it allows to use di erent values for the various occurrences of a given variable in the head position. This is exactly what we need to apply the \B ohm-out" technique. However, we may prove the ner result involving only terms with multiplicities, using the tupling combinators as B ohm did for the -calculus. 
Relating the calculi
In this section we show that, as far as -terms are concerned, the , r and m -semantics all coincide with L evy's interpretation. This is our main result. In order to prove it, we relate the , r and m -calculi. Let us rst see how the r -calculus may be encoded into the -calculus.
The idea of the encoding is quite simple: we have seen that E ( xM)N] ]u reduces to Clearly, Milner's encoding from to factorizes into the translation from to 1 composed with the previous encoding:
Note also that the encoding of internal choice is exactly the one we would expect:
Regarding the correspondence between the notions of reduction, the situation is now better than in the case of versus : we can show that the reduction steps are exactly mimicked in both directions. Actually, the r -calculus was designed exactly for this purpose. In particular, we can show the following: That is, one can test in the -calculus whether a closed r -term has a value or not. This shows that this encoding is adequate with respect to the \standard" observational semantics, where deadlocks are not observed. However, this is not enough for our purpose, since we want to be able to detect also the potential deadlocks using -calculus means. To this end, we could modify the observational semantics of the -calculus, allowing deadlocks to be observable in this calculus (in thecalculus, a deadlock is a term that does not perform any transition, labelled or unlabelled). This is not the way we shall follow here, since we are interested in the observational semantics as it was given by Milner in 18].
We shall instead establish that it is possible to detect deadlocks arising in the -calculus with multiplicities m , using the -calculus as it is. Intuitively, the reason is this: in the m -calculus, since the resources are always copies of a given term, one may assume that they are consumed sequentially, that is, without using the commutativity of bag composition. Then one may modify the previous encoding accordingly: a substitution item hE m = x i (where m 2 N) is not encoded as a parallel composition of m identical items hE 1 = x i, but as a \stack" of resources, and a speci c signal is emitted when no resource is available anymore, that is when there is a potential deadlock. Let us assume that and are names, belonging to N. Immediate observability on these names will represent respectively deadlock and divergence of the encoded terms. We de ne the encoding B from m into , as follows: 
Conclusion
To conclude this paper, let us brie y comment on our result, with respect to related work.
Firstly, we note that the -may testing equivalence M ' N on -terms coincides with the -bisimulation M N considered by Sangiorgi (see 24, 25] ), since he showed that the latter coincides with equality M = L N in L evys' interpretation. It is worth recalling here that the -bisimulation M N also coincides with the bisimulation M N induced by the -calculus enriched with internal choice (M N), as shown by Sangiorgi in 24] .
The reasons why we preferred to deal with may testing { besides the fact that this is the semantics considered by Milner in 18] { are the following. Firstly, bisimulation does not preserve the interpretation we would like to have for some constructs, and especially for internal choice. Moreover, given an encoding of a calculus into another, a bisimulation semantics, being based on the interaction capabilities of the encoded terms, does not leave any room to play with the target calculus. On the other hand, in the may testing approach, one has the possibility to identify sub-calculi of the target, and see what is the resulting semantics on the source calculus. Let us explain these two points in more detail.
In investigating the full abstraction problem for the lazy -calculus, Abramsky found out that this calculus is too weak. To make it \complete" with respect to the canonical denotational semantics, one must enrich it with a convergence testing facility, and some parallel feature, see However, parallel convergence testing is not the most general way to deal with parallel functions. In 5, 7] we have shown that parallel composition of functions is simply the join in the denotational semantics, which may be represented in the syntax by internal choice. For instance, P = ( xy:Cx) ( xy:Cy). Obviously, to preserve some properties of the interpretation of internal choice as a join, like for instance I = I, one should replace the bisimulation by a weaker notion, e.g. a simulation semantics, as given by the De nition 2.3. But then it is not clear that adding internal choice to the -calculus makes it as powerful as the -calculus.
Clearly, the may testing semantics is far less sensitive than bisimulation to the speci c way we describe the operational behaviour of the constructs of a calculus. It is closer to the denotational approach, whose purpose is precisely to abstract away from this operational description. Moreover, the may testing scenario leaves some room for questions that could not be asked using a bisimulation semantics. For instance, one may ask whether it is possible to identify interesting sub-calculi of the -calculus, making it closer to the \complete" lazy -calculus, enriched with convergence testing and some parallel facility. As Lavatelli shows in 12], such a calculus may be adequately encoded into the -calculus, though the encoding is not fully abstract { and we have seen why: the -calculus adds the possibility of creating and detecting deadlocks. Now, provided that we adopt the may testing semantics, the encoding of the -calculus is not very much a ected by modifying the translation of abstractions, as follows:
The encoding then goes into a sub-calculus where any input pre x takes the form !u(v 1 ; : : :; v k )P . Actually, since the law !P (P j !P) is still useful, it would be more convenient to adopt a di erent notion of reduction, namely ( u e w j u(e v)P) ! ( e w= e v ]P j u(e v)P) rather than modifying the syntax. Then one could interpret u(v 1 ; : : :; v k )P as providing the \service" P under the name u, which does not disappear once requested, while a message uw 1 w k is a call to this service, or an application of it, with parameters w 1 ; : : :; w k . In this \ !-calculus" internal choice is still de nable { more generally, ! may be used as a target to encode the -calculus with \in nite resources" 1r . Therefore one may conjecture that the bisimulation semantics induced by this encoding on -terms is still the equality of L evy-Longo trees. On the other hand, one may wonder whether the may testing semantics induced onterms by this kind of restricted -calculus (we should also allow output guards, to be able to de ne convergence testing) di ers from the canonical denotational semantics.
